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 1 
Gambling in Mythical Temporality: Ontological 
Excess and Virtual Reality 
 
 
A B S T R A C T 
 
This paper looks at certain features of games of chance to examine in greater detail the 
ways in which they thrive in a ‘mythical’ temporality. By examining the origins of mod-
ern gambling in the emergence of reason and its creation of an ontological excess that 
we refer to as ‘chance’, I argue that in order to understand the real significance of gam-
bling in an age of virtual reality and virtual gaming, we must be able to grasp its existen-
tial dimensions and the ecstatic ‘disappearance’ it permits. I suggest that the ways in 
which chance has been manifested as the non-human or automatic in gambling draw us 
closer to the essence of its existential character. Games of chance are explored as en-
counters with the sacred or divine which, in their connection to a mythic temporality, 
are seen as precursors of virtual gaming, whose technologies are now driving the 
growth of gambling.  
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Gambling in Mythical Temporality: Ontological 
Excess and Virtual Reality 
 
John Scanlan 
 
Man desires to dwell at a center, where there is the possibility of communicating with the gods. His 
dwelling is a microcosm; and so too is his body (Eliade, 1997: 172) 
 
Virtual reality is older than sin. It is the hallucination of heaven, the peyote vision, the dionysic stupor 
… any system devised for losing ourselves in another world (Schwartz, 1998: 362) 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Games of chance seem to be not only particularly characteristic of contem-
porary Western societies, in terms of their increasingly easy availability and 
the subsequent unsurprising growth of their use, but at the same time symp-
tomatic of the current ‘postmodern’ reincorporation of modernity’s excess-
es and residues. Little more than a decade ago the availability of games of 
chance in countries such as the United States of America and Great Britain 
was heavily regulated and largely restricted to established adult ‘play-
grounds’ (for instance, Las Vegas and Atlantic City in America, and mem-
bership-only casinos and uninviting bookmakers in Britain). 
The ontological surplus that makes gambling so alluring – the way it can 
flip one into a seemingly different causal flow – has become domesticated 
and transformed into one more leisure opportunity; and, for government, 
another source of revenue. At the same time, as MacKenzie Wark (2007: 
28-29) has noted, the prevalence of computer gaming that is built on virtual 
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reality technology seems to be generating a ludic reality that functions as an 
escape from the demands and disappointments of everyday life. Clearly gam-
ing differs from gambling in many important respects; but it also shares 
much in common, and today this is arguably even more the case. In contem-
porary life the technologies of virtual gaming may offer alternative futures 
that will never be realised in terms of real consequences, but they also in-
creasingly provide an outlet for the real hard stuff, for games of chance, 
which do significantly alter realities.  
In fact, what I intend to show here is that the route to existential reversal / 
undoing is now more open than it has ever been through the easy availability 
of games of chance in contemporary life. Furthermore, the essence of gam-
bling – which is no mere escape from reality, but implicitly always its de-
struction and remaking – has now found its perfect outlet in the nowhere of 
the network, and its gamer-inspired virtual gambling worlds which, of 
course, are now all too real.  
Yet to really understand the significance of this development it is neces-
sary to first look at the origins of modern gambling and the ways in which it 
has been manifested or understood in terms of qualities or states of being 
that are variously automatic, machinic or non-human. In other words, what I 
aim to show in this essay is that the reason why the world of virtual reality 
games can provide the apparatus to realise the perfect disappearance prom-
ised by games of chance is that they bring together in a wholly new and 
unique way machine technologies of repetition with the gambler’s impulse 
to become a kind of plaything of chance.  
Indeed, fundamental to this relationship is the fact that in mythical or 
premodern terms chance itself was conceived as a kind of cosmic machine 
that gave rise to a system of beliefs (or myths) that were – like contemporary 
virtual reality games – allegorical in nature.  
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CHANCE AS AUTOMATON 
The first thing that we must note is that in modernity chance becomes the 
mark of the anomalous within a more or less ordered and predictable world 
which itself derives its hold on knowledge and belief from the way that the 
human has been able to separate itself from the natural. This is most obvi-
ously seen to be the case, for instance, by the way nature is transformed into 
a resource that – in Martin Heidegger’s terms – is ‘orderable as a system of 
information’ (Heidegger, 1977: 13); but equally by the way society came to 
be seen as an entity that could have its flaws and imperfections corrected or 
normalized by submission to the ‘law of large numbers’ (Hacking, 1990: 
95-104). It is here that we first encounter one of a number of complicated 
ways in which chance is manifested (and encountered) as something inhu-
man or machinic.  
To begin to draw out the associations that will clarify these connections we 
must note that the attempt to characterize chance in this manner is drawn 
from an older, premodern Aristotelian logic, which nonetheless continued 
to support the perception of chance as a cosmic phenomenon. Indeed, in 
the terms of Aristotle’s Physics what we call chance is translated both by that 
word and by another term, ‘automaton’ (Tiffany, 2000: 81-82).1 This per-
haps seems a bit odd to us today because when we think of this word ‘autom-
aton’ we associate it more readily with the human-made and robotic, rather 
than the ontological phenomenon of chance (the random, the indetermi-
nate, and so on). But this reversal of meaning (from inhuman to human) has 
become rooted in Western thinking because, as Derek de Solla Price wrote, 
from ‘the age of Descartes, and perhaps up to and including the age of elec-
tronic computers’ automata are implicated in the ‘triumph of rational, 
mechanistic explanation’ over mythical alternatives (de Solla Price, 1964: 
10).  
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Nevertheless that fact does not remove a fundamental confusion seeing as 
self-moving machines that resembled human or animal forms – their human 
creation notwithstanding – left the source of their movement as the precise 
enigma that identified them as inhuman entities, which might explain why, 
as Daniel Tiffany has written, such automata have always been thought to 
have been possessed of divine spirit (Tiffany, 2000: 37).  
Consider then a quite different automaton that relates to chance in anoth-
er way: in terms of a modern calculating function that marks reason’s separa-
tion from nature or the divine. Charles Babbage’s Analytical Engine – con-
ceived in the 1830s and regarded as a forerunner of the modern computer – 
was a device intended to master the indeterminate and, as such, it gave phys-
ical form to a modern conception of chance as a calculable force.2 The ma-
chine itself stood as proof that human reason could be enhanced to produce 
the means of comprehending what was really a cosmic uncertainty. This 
modern machine symbolized how obsolete archaic notions of chance were in 
the modern world. Premodern chance was a different incorporeal machine, a 
divine automaton that attained its hold on the imagination through a variety 
mythical beliefs or practices.  
The crucial thing here is that the pre-modern world, which is held to con-
stitute a world of myth, was, from the inside, a deterministic world. In other 
words, there is no conception of chance as we understand it from a modern 
scientific point of view. What this additionally means is that life was gov-
erned not by the autonomous legislating self, but by a fatalistic ontology that 
imputed all causal power to, for instance, the gods. In other words, modern 
reason and subjectivity are very much modern and do not exist in the archaic 
mythos.  
And as Jean-Pierre Vernant (1988) and Hans Blumenberg (1985) – 
amongst others – have argued, the ancient logos that developed through the 
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work of the Greek philosophers did not supplant the belief in myth but ex-
isted alongside it: reason, in the form of the ancient logos was, as Vernant 
notes, always at risk from the persistence of familiar and comforting myths 
whose truths were likely to be delivered with a rhetorical skill sufficient to 
effect those who heard its tales ‘in the manner of an incantation’ (Vernant, 
1988: 206). Yet, within the mythos, it was still believed that the gestures 
and utterances of ‘reckless’ and ‘headstrong’ men, in particular, were able to 
harness this inhuman power, or become at one with it (Lincoln, 1996: 3-4).  
But to keep the main point within grasp – the idea that chance is in some 
ways inhuman and machinic – it is enough to note that the significance of 
the modern calculating machine is not simply that it signals a new ontology 
(a probabilistic conception of existence) but that it provides a vivid illustra-
tion of the way we deal with the inhuman in modernity: we build machines 
that take the place of the gods, or the God, that once served as the source of 
a cosmological mysteriousness.  
Babbage’s various machines, or the much earlier machines of others such 
as German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz (in the 1670s), illustrate the pos-
sibility of freedom from domination by external and non-human regulating 
powers (the gods, fate, and so on) as well as the associated mythical beliefs 
such dependence produced. First, mechanistic philosophy and, later, mo-
dernity more generally render these superfluous to an understanding of re-
ality. In doing so, however, this logic of calculation, as Harvie Ferguson 
notes, displaces the centrality of the cosmological mystery, but does not re-
move it: instead it is encountered at a subjective level as an ontological sur-
plus; which is to say, through the uncertainties of a being able to touch a re-
ality that is in excess of what is known (Ferguson, 1990: 159-60).  
This is the problem that takes up Heidegger’s interest in Being and Time. 
We see it in his notion of Dasein, which refers to being as outside of, or 
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proximate to, itself (‘“towards oneself”, the ‘back to’, and ‘letting oneself be 
encountered-by’”) (Heidegger, 1978: 329). In other words, for Heidegger, 
we moderns are in many ways condemned to see reality as excessive; we ex-
ist in such ecstases of time and space. One implication of this is that we may 
also self-consciously plunge into the surplus.  
 
 
GAMES OF CHANCE: ONTOLOGICAL EXCESS 
Writing and reflection on the philosophical status of games of chance offer 
abundant examples of their close identification with existential conditions 
and experiences, something that can perhaps be most usefully illustrated by 
a scene from Karel Reisz and James Toback’s 1974 film, The Gambler. 
What we see is a view of the seemingly impassive character of Axel Freed – 
the gambler of the title – standing beneath the ceiling lights of some Las Ve-
gas casino which, from our perspective, form a saintly nimbus around his 
slightly-bowed head (see Figure 1).3 This is an image whose elements are 
familiar enough to those who are acquainted with religious iconography: 
Axel’s devotional posture suggests that he is under the sway of a greater 
power and may have momentarily taken leave of himself or entered some 
altered state. The drama that unfolds as the film proceeds merely confirms 
this to be the case.  
In the scene in question Axel has just staked every last dollar he has on a 
hand of blackjack. Watching by his side is his companion Billie, who tells 
him he is insane. ‘Yes,’ he agrees calmly, ‘but I’m also blessed.’ In the game 
of blackjack a winning hand amounts to twenty-one. Axel has eighteen on 
two cards, with a third yet to be dealt. 
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1.  James Caan as Axel in The Gambler, 1974 (Dir: Karel Reisz) 
 
He does not take heed of the odds, which are clearly against him, but dou-
bles his bet – an outrageous wager considering that any card with a numeri-
cal value of more than three will break him. But Axel draws encouragement 
from the blessings he feels have been bestowed upon him during a day-long 
winning streak and uses his cards almost like sacramental offerings that are 
merely working to extract the required favours from God. As we reach the 
climax of this central scene he then utters the words that will allow him to 
transcend the reality of the world of reason: ‘give me the three’, he says, as if 
in direct contact with the divine automaton and the dealer turns over his fi-
nal card to reveal the three of hearts. 
The kind of threshold gambling that Axel takes part in throughout this film 
complicates the modern idea of experience as progressive movement, be-
cause here it is instead played-out in a series of disappearances – ecstatic 
moments – which transport Axel beyond the confines of normal social life. 
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In sharp contrast to the temporal constraints of the modern world – limited 
and reachable horizons – Axel floats into a timeless and ahistorical current 
where fate is steering him and in which the mobsters on the other side of the 
country who are out to kill him no longer matter, because in this moment, 
crowned by his halo, he has neither being nor existence in the strict sense 
we attach to these terms. He has ascended to the ranks of the blessed, trans-
cended the organic body. This is the experience of chance as an all-
consuming ontological excess.  
This Axel – loosely based on two of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s characters: 
Alexei in The Gambler and the so-called ‘Underground Man’ from his earli-
er Notes from Underground – exemplifies the observation of Mikhail Bakh-
tin that in much of Dostoevsky’s fiction we find not the bounded modern 
subject, but examples of existential dispersal, if not a desire to vanish, seem-
ingly driven by an idea that ‘a man must never coincide with himself.’ And 
thus, as with Axel / Alexei, ‘the formula of identity, A = A’ does not apply 
(Bakhtin, 1984: 59). Like his counterpart in Dostoevsky’s original story, 
Axel is under the sway of the (divine) automaton of chance and has nothing 
but contempt for how reason might serve as a guide to the best way to live.  
To become at one with chance was to be an automaton, an apparently self-
moving being, whose motive power and ‘actions’ remained a mystery to baf-
fled onlookers. In Dostoevsky’s case it entailed, as Boris Christa notes, an 
‘existential sensation of draining the cup of experience to the dregs’; of, in 
fact, disappearing: 
 
Nothing, [Dostoevsky] assures us, can compare with the feeling of being alone 
in a strange country, not knowing where the next meal will come from, and 
then staking one’s ‘very, very last gulden’ on the turn of a roulette wheel 
(Christa, 2002: 106).  
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Famously, Dostoevsky did plunge into the ontological surplus himself, 
thereby making Alexei – for posterity – a kind of literary double. He spent 
extended periods gambling intensely and actually emerged after one losing 
run with this short novel, The Gambler, as payment for debts he had racked 
up at the roulette tables during an extensive bout of this so-called ‘fever’ that 
was said to assail him periodically (MacAndrew, 1981: 4-5). Thus, it is no 
surprise to see that the experiences of his fictional gambler, glorying in in-
determinacy and seeking ecstatic transport, are not only mirrored in his own 
real-life correspondence from this time, but also provide a much imitated 
template for a variety of fictional and biographical accounts by other gam-
blers, many of which are also literary doubles.4  
From these sources we gain some understanding of how chance is experi-
enced as something divine or sacred and how an attachment to games of 
chance puts in motion an existence directed towards disappearances. De-
sire, Dostoevsky’s Underground Man remarks, was what had more than 
once forced him into a kind of nowhere and what it left was mere husk of a 
self, which was thereafter always at risk of being broken, reduced to bits 
(Dostoevsky, 1972: 35). Yet, the submission to the inhuman dimensions of 
chance comes to exemplify something that is very modern; namely, the pow-
er of the unknown – in the shape of the future, or of one’s own sense of his-
toricity – to shape life. 
 
 
THE MYTHOS AS DRAMATI C SCENARIO 
The spatio-temporal dimension of gambling, then, can be understood in 
terms of Heidegger’s Dasein, which points to the ek-static nature of being. 
Thus, subjective movement to a point of disappearance becomes a singular 
moment of ek-stasis, which literally means ‘standing out’ and, as such, ‘re-
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fers to the fact that, in temporalizing itself, Dasein is always already “be-
yond” itself in the world’ (Macann, 1993: 100). Hence, we might under-
stand the effect of chance by thinking of it in terms of the kind of mythical or 
superstitious responses it gives rise to. Recall, as I noted above, that subjec-
tivity is absent in the mythos and that there was no distinction between sub-
ject and world as we find in modernity. In other words, there was no outside 
perspective from which nature was seen as object and thus no perspective 
from which chance becomes (as in the modern account) this calculable force 
to be mastered, nor – as with gambling – this ontological excess that can be 
gone into.  
Its cosmological dimensions, as Blumenberg wrote in his Work on Myth, 
were characterized by ‘powers that could be appealed to, that could be 
turned away from or toward one’ (Blumenberg, 1985: 13). But in such an 
existence there was no position exterior to the mythos: all within the world’s 
unique singularity took part in what might as well have been a coincidence of 
events that were played out according to an already existing script (in con-
temporary virtual games this becomes the unknown algorithm). This is close 
to one sense of the term ‘mythos’ as used by Aristotle in his Poetics, where, 
as Fernand Hallyn notes, the word refers to the careful arrangement of 
events in a dramatic scenario (Hallyn, 1990: 13-14). Clearly, in this exam-
ple, the ‘actors’ within a drama or game are not the same as legislating 
agents – modern autonomous actors/subjects – but more like bit-players 
who can contribute to and illuminate, a tale.  
In such a way, the mythos more generally reveals itself through unfolding 
events that are interpreted then as actions. For Nietzsche, as Hans Blumen-
berg notes, the idea that causal efficacy rests not with the subject but in in-
animate and non-human forces was ‘the characterizing mark of all mytholo-
gies’ and the source of animism or ‘magic’ (Blumenberg, 1985: 13). In the 
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myth world such an orientation to the reality is manifested in the practice of 
throwing or casting lots which, as Richard Onians noted, was a means of 
rousing some fundamental causal force: 
 
The lots (and possibly the vessel from which they were shaken) were either 
credited with a virtue of their own, possibly even consciousness, ensuring the 
right decision as the balance of might, or [alternatively were] thought to be 
controlled by powers who thus revealed their will (Onians, 1988: 393). 
 
Such a controlling power also corresponds to the aforementioned ‘divine 
automaton’ (Bryant, 2003: 248). Of course, dicing and casting lots persist 
in gambling. But the more important parallel between the world of myth and 
the reality of games of chance is that vestiges of the mythical or archaic per-
sist and infuse the lifeworld of the modern gambler on multiple levels (Reith, 
1999). The premodern superstitions of gamblers – manifested not only in 
the form of dreams or premonitions, fetishes and good luck charms, but in 
omens and utterances that reach out to chance and request to be drawn in to 
its mysteries – illustrate that the gambler has already been taken in by an 
archaic and unscientific understanding of the world or, in Gerda Reith’s 
terms, a ‘magico-religious’ worldview (1990: 156-181).  
Returning to The Gambler, examples of this are apparent throughout the 
film. In addition to those already mentioned we see, for instance, Axel at 
odds with a fellow player when they get to discussing what is happening in 
some in-progress basketball games on which he has a lot of money riding. 
Axel objects to the idea that events can be understood in terms of ‘latest 
scores’ and suggests that there is something much bigger going on – as if 
the gods are moving in his favour – when he says ‘Scores? These aren’t 
scores, they’re omens,’ drawing out that word for effect – ‘o-m-e-n-s.’  
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Yet despite such trust in fate, we know that Axel is a modern man. In his 
wagering he comes from a position in which he can objectify his position in 
the world – he knows, for instance, that reason has separated itself from 
chance; it is a source of dismay for him and he willfully chooses to destroy 
everything that attempts to keep these two worlds from touching each other. 
Thus, where games of chance were once clearly a means of divine communi-
cation, now they permit him to plunge in to the ontological excess from a 
seemingly external space-time (that of the bounded and finite rational 
world), to be transported to a causality in which the distinction between the 
player and the game becomes quite complicated. What it implies is that the 
player is played by chance and not the other way around. This is to be in the 
midst of things; something that marks the ‘experience’ as one of repetitive 
or automatic motion – an out of body experience.  
If we look to Roger Caillois’s Man, Play and Games (originally published 
in 1961), and its typologies of games and the explorations of how these re-
flect a variety of altered states, it is interesting to see that the language used 
to describe such games is echoed later in the descriptions Jean Baudrillard 
would use to suggest that the features of contemporary life produce an inte-
gral reality (a reality that absorbs all negativity) characterized by what he 
terms ‘the object’, which is not merely the object world, but the world of 
‘inert and dumb phenomena’ that seems often to push us around and deter-
mine our reality (Caillois, 2001; Baudrillard, 2003: 3-5).  
Caillois notes, for instance, that certain kinds of play combine elements of 
‘simulation’ (the state of being another, of removal from oneself which, he 
writes, ‘tends to alienate and transport’) and ‘vertigo’ (a whirling or falling; 
dizziness and disorder), which, he believed, could give way to ‘an indescrib-
able metamorphosis in the condition of existence’ that ‘seems to remove the  
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2. The final scene from The Gambler. Axel admires the wound that confirms his 
proximity to the real of chance 
 
 
player far from the authority, values, and influence of the real world’ to drift 
towards ‘the sacred’ (Caillois, 2001: 75-76). And for the sacred we might 
read the other-than-human, the inhuman or, even, incalculable chance, 
which becomes for our gambler more tangible than the world in which 
things are fixed and predictable.  
This brings me to the concluding scenes in the film adaptation of The 
Gambler, which sees Axel return to the university where he is a professor of 
literature (teaching Dostoevsky, of course). There, under pressure from 
Mafia money lenders, he is forced to bribe one of his students – the star 
player of the basketball team – and convince him to deliberately lose a match 
in order that his creditors can recover the huge sums he has lost gambling. 
When the desired outcome is achieved and the fixed game frees him from 
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the clutches of the mobsters it signals for Axel a reality that he cannot bear 
to live with: namely, that the game – any game – has a known outcome and 
that when all is said and done, the game is about something as grubby as 
money. This fact draws him back from the ecstasies of nowhere to the grim 
realties of life. And in order to reintroduce chance into his life he immedi-
ately heads for danger and almost gets killed in a bar brawl, but survives. 
Blessed once more.  
The last frames of the film show Axel catching himself in a mirror and smil-
ing proudly at the gaping wound on his face; a wound that signifies that the 
game of chance can never entirely be controlled. 
 
 
TIME ON THE THRESHOLD 
If myths and superstitions are ways in which the absolutism of reality was 
held at a distance, then the gestures and paraphernalia of games of chance – 
dice, cards, randomly drawn lots, and so on – allow us to illustrate the diver-
gent ontological assumptions in archaic and modern belief. In archaic prac-
tice such objects were used, as it were, sacramentally, in recognition of the 
divine automaton and did not constitute an attempt to break out of reality, 
precisely because there was no such idea that one could step outside of life 
and assume the agency of an historical actor (Spariosu, 1989: 15). Modern 
games of chance differ from divination because they assume that the hold of 
reality can be broken and that the ecstatic moment brings us into contact 
with the inhuman. Wagering assumes agency, but it also reveals that there is 
a point beyond which the player is transformed into a toy of chance, seem-
ingly subject to a repetition compulsion.  
Yet in such wagering – and even the make-believe of virtual reality games 
– we can perhaps glimpse their connections to the modern desire to master 
John Scanlan, ‘Gambling in Mythical Temporality’, International Political Anthropolo-
gy, Vol. 1: 3 (2009), 179-195. (Pre-publication accepted version of article). 
 
 16 
nature and objectify the world. Indeed, while the masochistic compulsion to 
repeat that Freud, for instance, identified in Dostoevsky’s gambling reflects 
more generally his notion of the death drive, or in the words of Teresa de 
Lauretis, a desire to be ‘inorganic’, we should not ignore the similarity of 
this kind of repetition to apparently less pathological – indeed, avowedly 
rational – practices that both reflect the separation of subject from world 
whilst also attempting to reconfigure the context within which experience 
can take place (Freud, 2001: 175-198; de Lauretis, 2003: 552).  
For Avital Ronell, the experimental method of modern science engages an 
active-passive mode of being that explores and institutes repeatability as a 
‘test drive’ underpinning not merely the sciences – which simulates and 
tests alternative realities with all the skill of make-believe – but modern life 
more generally (Ronell, 2005). Thus, it is through the prevalence of experi-
ences like examinations, job interviews, and the requirement to be prepared 
for retraining and redeployment as the economy demands, that we become 
prepared for the possibility that life and reality as we know it can be recon-
figured to leave us temporarily displaced, not at one with ourselves.  
The active-passive disposition we see in wagering and in scientific testing 
is also common to altered states in general, including those induced by sub-
stance addiction (Ronell, 2003: 59-73). What these share with other ecstat-
ic diversions induced by states of hypnosis, sleep, madness, perceptual illu-
sion and so on arise from the fact that they are all characteristically indeter-
minate conditions that unfold around the threshold of subjective control. So 
if there is any ‘trigger’ for the disappearance of self we might suggest that it 
is intimately related to modern embodied subjectivity and the unknown fu-
tures that are held up as potential sources of enrichment for it. The most 
vivid gambling literature, which includes fictions, memoirs, and mixtures of 
both forms, indicates that gambling establishes its hold as the result of tak-
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ing seriously the consequences of being modern – which is to say, through 
the belief that one is an historical actor existing in a temporal flow that can 
be directed or mastered. 
If our vision of Axel with his radiant halo reveals him, in the end, to be no 
more than a puppet of the automaton of chance, it is only because he first 
willed an outcome that his co-creator James Toback called ‘a permanent 
condition of transcendence.’ This can only exist in the ‘death’ of the subject 
(Dempsey, 1980-81: 26). The active-passive testing disposition, as de-
scribed by Avital Ronell, may provide an account of how the determined and 
autonomous subject (who, we must remember) gives birth to the gambler, 
can also turn into the will-less automaton of chance:   
 
Being tested, which brings together attempter with the tempting does not fall 
purely into the zone of action or its purported other – passivity – but engages 
both at once. Already the locution ‘being tested,’ always awkward and slightly 
wrenching, invites the intervention of the passive where action or at least some 
activity is indicated (Ronell, 2005: 143).  
 
In letters to his faraway wife, Anya, dating from the height of his gambling 
fever, Dostoevsky tried to convey the power that took hold of him when he 
stood at the roulette tables, as time after time he determinedly went into the 
play firmly believing that he had the power to compete with chance. Inevita-
bly what we read are descriptions of just the opposite: he became merely a 
plaything of its greater force (Koteliansky, 1926). Yet he was experiencing 
existence as something pure, as something extra-human. The sense of phys-
ical abduction, which pushes the repetition of play to disastrous ends, comes 
through in descriptions of the body in pain, under the direction of unknown 
motivations, or as Dostoevsky’s wife recalled, bound by gambling’s ‘chains’ 
(Koteliansky, 1926: 136).  
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Indeed, as Bakhtin revealed, Dostoevsky consciously intended to draw a 
temporal parallel between his account of gambling and his portrayal of im-
prisonment in House of the Dead:  
 
The life of convicts and the life of gamblers – for all their differences in content 
– are equally life taken out of life (that is, taken out of common, ordinary life) 
[…] And the time of penal servitude and the time of gambling are – for all their 
profound differences – an identical type of time, similar to the final moments of 
consciousness before execution or suicide, similar in general to the time of cri-
sis. All this is time on the threshold (Bakhtin, 1984: 172).  
   
Myth, as Hans Blumenberg suggested, develops as a response to the anxiety 
of confronting the total power of a world beyond one’s control; of existing 
on the threshold of two worlds and potentially having to repeatedly face 
death or crises of some sort. This anxiety, in itself, is pathological – or, in 
other words, simply produces the repetition that perpetuates the hold it 
manages to exercise over the imagination (Blumenberg, 1985: 6).  
We can see an example of this in a scene from Dostoevsky’s The Gambler, 
in which a character known as ‘the General’ appears at the roulette table, 
under the watchful eye of Alexei, who looks on as he places a bet. The Gen-
eral slowly takes ‘three hundred francs in gold’ and puts them on the black, 
as Alexei recounts: 
 
The black won. He didn't pick up his winnings, but left them on the table. The 
black won again. He left them again. And when the red won that time, he lost 
twelve hundred francs in one go. I am convinced that black cats were clawing at 
his heart, and that if the stake had been twice or perhaps three times greater, he 
would have lost control and showed his agitation (Dostoevsky, 1981: 30). 
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According to Bakhtin, such descriptions form part of the ‘kind of hell’ 
Dostoevsky wanted to present in The Gambler in order to demonstrate the 
ease with which gambling at the limit of control reduces the player to noth-
ing, a mere plaything of chance (Bakhtin, 1984: 172). Here money loses 
the associations that sustain its relation to value in the day-to-day world, 
where it is attached to things that are substantial – those items we exchange 
it for – and where it leaves traces all around. In games of chance money 
simply disappears to be abstracted into a mere token that will produce vary-
ing levels of pleasure or violence, as Alexei finds when he is compelled to 
recklessly play all of his remaining money as if it was the last opportunity he 
would ever have in his life: ‘I became frantic, seized the remaining two thou-
sand gulden, and threw them on the first twelve numbers – just like that, 
without any calculation.’ And again, in a description that speaks of posses-
sion: ‘In a daze, I pushed all that pile onto the red, but then I suddenly came 
to my senses. Cold fear ran down my spine and made my hands and legs 
tremble’ (Dostoevsky, 1981: 144).  
The fact that money never quite manifests itself as real value and remains 
always fluid prepares the way for the eventual stripping away that is acted 
upon the player given over to the ecstasy of the game. The truth about mon-
ey, as Marx saw, was that when you got right down to it, it was a very myste-
rious thing. It is neither one specific thing, nor another; yet this gives it the 
‘magic’ or ‘occult’ powers that allow it to be the universal equivalent (Marx, 
1954: 96, 152). It is ‘the Philosopher’s Stone the alchemists have sought in 
vain’ (Marx in Asendorf, 1993: 30). And this quality of money, Jean 
Baudrillard thought, was what makes gambling ‘extraordinary’ (Baudrillard, 
1999: 183). It is ‘the locus of both ecstasy and the disappearance of value’ 
because: 
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in gambling money is neither produced nor destroyed, but disappears as value 
and re-emerges as appearance, restored to its pure appearance through the in-
stantaneous reversibility of winning and losing (Baudrillard, 1999: 183).  
 
This reversibility is the switch that alternates experience between the reality 
and the virtual. 
 
 
THE MIDDLE OF NOWHERE 
The spatially indeterminate, virtual and unbounded vistas of the network are 
found through the portal of the personal computer screen (and its miniature 
portable offspring). These are machines designed for instant access, repeti-
tion, and a kind of ecstatic transport that takes us into different experiential 
spaces. Now, without any need for any actual movement to places where 
games of chance were once contained and controlled, the transport of sen-
sory experience the Dostoevskian gambler found can be achieved through 
virtual reality technologies. Ecstatic removal now predominantly resides in 
the limitless domains opened up by a reality entertained by the chance en-
counter, by reverie and by limitless novelties. A perhaps less toxic version of 
this reality exists in the user-generated content of what is known as Web 2.0 
and found in websites such as flickr.com, which on the one hand perfectly 
illustrate the network as a universe of potentially infinite and pleasurable 
coincidences, but more importantly speak of a culture in which we need 
‘hits’ ‘fixes’ and the continual stimulation that the logic of ‘surfing’ life 
promises.  
Via these machines, the new automata of an indeterminate and excessive 
ontological reality, chance is forever loosened from the materiality of the old 
fashioned calculating machine, which gave us limited mastery over uncer-
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tainty. Today’s network is a route into mythic time – time out of time – in 
which ceaselessly weaving interconnections promise to spread subjectivity 
amongst what Erik Davis calls their ‘complex fabrics of unpredictable and 
semiautonomous threads’ (Davis, 2004: 384). This, too, is a disappear-
ance. Thus to understand the truth of the view that games of chance have 
truly found their time it is necessary to understand how, in contemporary 
life, myth can meet with reality in a so-called virtual space that is nonetheless 
a site of real experimentation.  
In the technologized life of an online surfer, the computer becomes an ec-
stasy machine; it promises potentially, if not actually, even more than one 
can desire. Where games of chance are concerned it promises the Dostoev-
skian gambler’s contact with the real of chance; the possibility of being 
played oneself by the machine – through an immediacy of experience that is 
further guaranteed by the development of a near pure gambling market that 
‘mainlines’ hits more effectively and with fewer obstacles to their attainment 
than any drug probably ever could. Now, peer-to-peer wagering – unmedi-
ated by the limitations of bookmakers or casinos – promises to open up the 
virtual world to new and baffling encounters, sort of aleatoric Turing tests 
(are the people on the other end real? Does it matter?), with strange and 
faceless players who might be located anywhere in the world seeing as the 
spatial indeterminacy of the networked experience establishes online exist-
ence precisely as a nowhere.  
Yet, to be nowhere in this sense is to be at the centre of it all; in the midst 
of the action. Thus, by its very own logic of ‘loosening person-to-place con-
tiguity requirements’ the techno-ecstatic network opens a wormhole into 
the void (Mitchell, 2003: 144). Now players can ‘propose a wager’ on any-
thing that seems appealing to them, and ‘then reach out to everyone else on 
the network’, perhaps as a Zeus or Achilles would in their day have consult-
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ed their mythical gods with the dice to settle a dispute, but now – and no less 
importantly – it is ‘to find a taker for the bet’ that will affirm one’s existence 
(Landow, 2006: 366).  
In gambling terms, the nowhere of the network is Las Vegas taken to an 
unprecedented pitch of intensity: it takes ‘play money’ and makes it vanish 
in a way the gambling chip could never match. The irony is that this spatial 
indeterminacy – of being nowhere or diffused in the network – gains its real-
ity, its hold on life, as William Mitchell notes, because of virtual money 
(2003: 144). The strange reality of a credit economy in these techno-
ecstatic conditions is indicated by the fact that it creates another level of dis-
tance from the reality of a world of Lockean primary qualities (namely, those 
things we can touch and feel and quantify). Virtual money – a simple credit 
card, for instance – is already an ek-static conceit in the way it allows us to 
extend ourselves into an as yet unknown future and to pay for the experienc-
es we have today at some later date.  
Indeed, what is more appropriate than to point to the similarity between 
these conditions and the so-called ‘futures’ market developed in the 1970s 
to trade in ‘intangible [stock] options’ and the ‘futures’ of currencies (Tay-
lor, 2004: 168). These ‘futures’ or ‘junk bonds’ (so-called because their 
high-risk status indicated their possible rapid transformation to negative 
value, or nothing) were traded in a system that was set up by the Chicago 
Board of Trade and actually based on the example of the high-stakes Las 
Vegas casino (Taylor, 2004: 168). This is the meta level of MacKenzie 
Wark’s (2007) gamespace – the economic reality of life today. At the sub-
jective level it feeds into the ideology of life as a game that can be mastered.  
Add to the mix a network of limitless dimensions that is potentially availa-
ble to all – not simply traders playing with the money of others – and in 
which gambling (amidst the abundance of porn, pirated media, and all the 
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other diversions available on tap) signifies a ‘hit’ par excellence. Then we 
have a shape-shifting beyond and real of chance that may be accessed at any 
time, and in which subjective proximity to total reversal and disappearance 
takes on those Dostoevskian proportions I have discussed.  
The dangers of ek-static – virtual – money were anticipated by the earliest 
theorists of the digital age, with Arthur Kroker and Michael Weinstein, for 
instance, foreseeing our current economic travails in the meeting of freely 
circulating information with virtual money:  
 
we speak of money as suddenly hyper-driven and flipped into virtual, twenty-
four hour data exchanges, of the slip-streaming of consciousness […] then we 
can also finally know virtual economy as a fatal, delirious, crash-event (Kroker 
and Weinstein, 1994: 77).  
 
In such times, the danger is that we may become ‘celebrants of amnesia’ and 
‘agents of forgetfulness’ (Kroker and Weinstein, 1994: 77). 
 
 
NOTES 
1. This usage of the term ‘automaton’ is not to be confused with what Harvie Fer-
guson has described as the ‘image’ of the human body as an automaton, which 
was found in Renaissance and early modern thought and influenced by Newtoni-
an physics. An example is found in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, where the hu-
man agent is described as driven by cogs, springs, and wheels. In other words, 
the human is ‘a self-moving or self-adjusting mechanism’ (Ferguson, 1997: 4).  
2. The term ‘computer’, too, gets us mixed up in similar ‘human or machine?’ con-
fusions, as Simon Schaffer notes: ‘as with terms such as typewriter, the word 
computer here [in relation to Babbage] referred to a human being, in this case 
the hireling employed to perform the exhausting reckoning’ required by astro-
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nomical observations. ‘Babbage himself applied for the post of computer at the 
Royal Observatory, in summer 1814, until dissuaded from the thankless task’ 
(Shaffer, 1994: 203).  
3. Karel Reisz (dir.) The Gambler [film], from a screenplay by James Toback (Uni-
versal Pictures, 1974). When no page number is cited I am quoting from the 
film’s dialogue. 
4. It may be no more than coincidence that the best gambling memoirs are accom-
panied, as was Dostoevsky’s real-life experiences of gambling, by fictional or 
semi-fictional counterparts, or it may simply be a manifestation of a need, also 
achieved in writing, to create alternative realities. Amongst these twins are 
Frederick Barthelme’s (1997) novel Bob the Gambler and the memoir written 
with his brother, Steven (1999), entitled Double Down: Reflections on Gam-
bling and Loss; Jack Richardson’s (1980) Memoirs of a Gambler and his bio-
graphical play Xmas in Las Vegas (1972); Jonathan Rendall’s (1999) semi-
fictional Twelve Grand, some of which reflects parts of his (1997) memoir, This 
Bloody Mary is the Last Thing I Own; and finally there is James Toback’s 
screenplay of The Gambler, in which the character of Axel reflects not just those 
characters of Dostoevsky’s I have noted, but is based also in Toback’s life as a 
university professor and gambler. On this latter point, see Dempsey (1980-81: 
24-35). Indeed, all of the above – aside from Dostoevsky and Rendall – were al-
so, at one time or another, academics. 
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